Abstract
This study examines the relationship between policy, politics, and governance in Nigeria’s power sector, with a focus on reforms introduced under the Electric Power Sector Reform Act (EPSRA) of 2005 and the privatization of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria. The study is motivated by the persistent gap between reform expectations and actual sector performance, despite extensive policy interventions. Anchored in Political Economy Theory and Institutional Theory, the paper analyzes how political interests, elite influence, and weak institutional capacity shape policy implementation and governance outcomes. The study adopts a qualitative research design based on documentary and content analysis of policy documents, regulatory reports, academic literature, and industry data. Findings show that although reforms led to structural changes such as sector unbundling and the establishment of the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC), these have not translated into improved electricity supply. This is largely due to policy inconsistency, political interference in tariff decisions, regulatory fragility, infrastructure deficits, and weak accountability mechanisms. The study argues that the core challenge in Nigeria’s power sector is not the absence of policy frameworks but the weakness of institutions and governance structures required to implement them effectively. It concludes that achieving sustainable improvement requires strengthening regulatory autonomy, ensuring transparent and cost-reflective tariff systems, reducing political interference, and aligning policy objectives with institutional capacity. The paper contributes to ongoing debates on infrastructure governance by demonstrating that effective power sector reform in Nigeria is fundamentally dependent on political commitment and institutional strengthening.
Keywords: Power sector governance; Political economy; Electricity reform; Institutional theory; Nigeria.
DOI: www.doi.org/10.36349/fujpam.2026.v5i01.009
author/Omeje Sunday & Onu Uzoma David
journal/FUJPAM Vol. 5, No. 1
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